Facts of the Case
The High Court dealt with four connected petitions
challenging the order dated 3 July 2020 passed by the learned Sessions Judge,
Gurugram, in exercise of powers under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
By the impugned order, a criminal complaint titled Raman
Sharma vs K. Makrand Pandurang and Others was sent to Police Station
Sector-10-A, Gurugram, for lodging of an FIR and investigation. The
petitioners, who were public servants holding different administrative and
planning-related posts, challenged the order and consequential proceedings
arising from it.
The petitioners included IAS, HCS, Town Planning
and other public officials serving in various capacities, including the
Municipal Corporation, Haryana Shehri Vikas Pradhikaran and the Town and
Country Planning Department.
The underlying complaint contained allegations
relating primarily to Sector 94, Gurugram. According to the complainant,
illegal possession, unauthorised construction, factories, warehouses, residential
and commercial buildings had allegedly come up on land notified as “Open Space”
or falling within a green area/green belt.
The complaint alleged, among other things, that:
- Encroachment, illegal construction, spilling of garbage, collection
of stones, cement and chemicals, and commercial activities were taking
place on land reserved as a green area in the notified open space of
Sector 94, Gurugram.
- Illegal factories, warehouses, residential buildings and commercial
structures had allegedly been raised in the notified open space.
- Sector 94 had allegedly been notified as open space under the
Gurgaon-Manesar Urban Complex Plan Scheme, where construction was
prohibited, and the area adjoining the Pataudi-Gurugram Road was also
stated to fall within the green belt.
- Land grabbers allegedly raised unauthorised constructions in
violation of planning and urban development laws.
- Factories, warehouses and construction sites allegedly caused
environmental pollution by discharging waste and operating without adequate
safety measures.
- It was alleged that certain entities had wrongfully obtained GST
registrations at the concerned addresses, with an apprehension that
prescribed GST might not have been paid.
- Sale deeds were allegedly registered in collusion with officials
and staff of the concerned Tehsil in relation to land stated to be
notified under Section 7A by the Town and Country Planning Department.
- The complaint alleged misuse of official powers, illegal
registration of sale deeds, corruption, benami property transactions,
money laundering, public nuisance, endangerment to human life and
conspiracy.
- State officials were accused of supporting or failing to prevent
the alleged illegal acts.
- It was further alleged that despite repeated requests, the police
had not registered an FIR, necessitating recourse to Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C.
On 3 July 2020, the learned Sessions Judge directed
that the complaint be sent to Police Station Sector-10-A, Gurugram, for lodging
of an FIR and investigation, observing that the matter required investigation
and that registration of an FIR was necessary.
The petitioners challenged this direction before
the High Court.
Issues
Involved
The principal issues before the High Court were:
- Whether an order directing investigation under Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. against public servants could be passed in the absence of valid
previous sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988.
- Whether the learned Sessions Judge had properly applied judicial
mind before directing registration of an FIR and investigation.
- Whether statutory restrictions on cognizance, prosecution or
investigation under the Prevention of Corruption Act, PMLA, environmental
statutes, urban development laws and municipal legislation had been duly
considered.
- Whether the impugned order was sustainable when the complaint
invoked numerous offences governed by special statutory requirements
concerning sanction, authorisation, prior notice or complaint by a
competent authority.
- Whether a mere statement that the Court had gone through the
complaint and documents and heard the complainant was sufficient
compliance with the requirement of application of mind under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C.
- Whether the complaint and order could validly proceed against
public servants without obtaining the sanction/approval required by law.
Petitioner’s
Arguments
The petitioners contended that they were public
servants and that the impugned order was legally unsustainable for several
reasons.
1. Prior
Sanction Under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act
It was argued that under Section 19 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, no Court could take cognizance of specified
offences punishable under the Act against public servants without previous
sanction of the competent Central Government or State Government, as
applicable.
The petitioners specifically relied upon the
statutory protection relating to offences under Sections 7, 11, 13 and 15 of
the Prevention of Corruption Act.
2. Restriction
on Police Investigation Under PMLA
The petitioners submitted that in relation to
offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, the
police could not investigate unless specifically authorised by the Central
Government through a general or special order and subject to prescribed
conditions.
3. Sanction
Under Urban Development Laws
It was argued that prosecution for offences under
Sections 3, 10, 11 and 12 of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban
Areas Act, 1975 could not be instituted without previous sanction of the
Director or an officer authorised in writing.
A similar requirement was asserted regarding
offences under Sections 3, 6 and 12 of the Punjab Scheduled Roads and
Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963.
4. Statutory
Requirements Under Environmental Laws
The petitioners argued that cognizance of offences
under the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 could not be
taken except upon a complaint by the competent Board or authorised officer, or
by a person complying with the prescribed prior notice requirement.
Similar objections were raised under:
- Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; and
- Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.
5. Haryana
Municipal Corporation Act
It was contended that cognizance of specified
offences under the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 could not be taken
except upon a complaint or information from the Commissioner or another duly
authorised officer or authority.
6. Section
197 Cr.P.C.
The petitioners further contended that, in respect
of IPC allegations connected with acts performed by public servants in
discharge of official duties, the protection and sanction requirement under
Section 197 Cr.P.C. was attracted.
7. No Prima
Facie Offence
It was argued that no prima facie offence was made
out against the petitioners under various IPC provisions invoked in the
complaint, including provisions relating to abetment, conspiracy, criminal
breach of trust, cheating, forgery and use of forged documents.
8. Lack of
Application of Mind
The petitioners strongly contended that the learned
Sessions Judge passed the impugned order casually and mechanically without
proper application of judicial mind.
Reliance was placed upon Maksud Saiyed vs State
of Gujarat and Others, (2008) 5 SCC 668, for the proposition that where
jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint under Section 156(3) or Section 200
Cr.P.C., judicial application of mind is necessary and criminal law cannot be
set into motion as a matter of course.
9. Reliance
on Anil Kumar vs M.K. Aiyappa
The petitioners relied upon Anil Kumar vs M.K.
Aiyappa and Another, (2013) 10 SCC 705, contending that in the absence of
sanction from the competent authority, an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.
directing investigation against public servants could not legally be passed.
10.
Jurisdictional and Locus Standi Objections
It was further argued that the allegations related
to Sector 94, Gurugram, which allegedly fell under the jurisdiction of GMDA and
outside the municipal limits of the Municipal Corporation, Gurugram.
The petitioners also contended that the complaint
was in the nature of a public interest litigation without proper disclosure of
the complainant’s credentials, locus standi or individual prejudice.
Respondent’s
Arguments
State’s
Stand
The counsel appearing for the State also assailed
the impugned order and adopted the arguments advanced on behalf of the
petitioners.
Complainant/Respondent
No. 2’s Stand
Respondent No. 2 opposed the petitions and argued
that:
- There was no illegality or perversity in the impugned order.
- The order had been passed in accordance with law after proper
application of mind.
- The complainant was a resident of Gurugram and was aggrieved by
alleged illegal constructions raised by land grabbers and builders in
violation of various statutory provisions.
- The public servants named in the complaint had allegedly failed to
act against illegal activities being carried out by builders and land
grabbers.
- The complainant possessed sufficient locus standi to initiate the
complaint.
- No ground existed for interference by the High Court.
Court Order
/ Findings
The High Court allowed the petitions and set aside
the impugned order dated 3 July 2020 qua the petitioners.
1. Statutory
Restrictions Could Not Be Ignored
The High Court observed that no Court could take
cognizance of specified offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act against
public servants without previous sanction of the concerned Government.
The Court also recognised that:
- Police could not investigate offences under Sections 3 and 4 of
PMLA unless specifically authorised by the Central Government in that
regard.
- Sanction was required for prosecution under relevant provisions of
the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975.
- Sanction requirements also applied under the Punjab Scheduled Roads
and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development) Act, 1963.
- Cognizance under specified environmental statutes was subject to
complaints by competent Boards, authorised officers or compliance with
prescribed prior notice requirements.
- Cognizance under the Haryana Municipal Corporation Act, 1994 was
subject to a complaint by the competent authority.
2. Absence
of Required Prior Notice
The Court noted that no prior notice had been
issued by respondent No. 2 for prosecution of the petitioners as required under
the Air Act, Environment Protection Act and Water Act.
3. No
Central Government Authorisation Shown Under PMLA
The High Court observed that respondent No. 2 had
failed to produce any general or special order of the Central Government
authorising police investigation into offences punishable under Sections 3 and
4 of PMLA.
4. Special
Judge’s Powers and Section 19 Sanction
The Court acknowledged that a Special Judge is
deemed to be a Magistrate under Section 5(4) of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988 and is clothed with magisterial powers under the Cr.P.C.
However, the Court held that Section 19 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act prohibited cognizance of offences under Sections
7, 11, 13 and 15 without previous sanction of the concerned Government.
5. Anil
Kumar vs M.K. Aiyappa Followed
The High Court examined the Supreme Court decision
in Anil Kumar vs M.K. Aiyappa and Another, (2013) 10 SCC 705, where the
question concerned whether sanction under Section 19 of the Prevention of
Corruption Act was a precondition for ordering investigation against a public
servant under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. even at the pre-cognizance stage.
The High Court noted that the Supreme Court had
answered the question in the affirmative.
6. Effect of
Manju Surana vs Sunil Arora
The High Court also considered Manju Surana vs
Sunil Arora, (2018) 5 SCC 557, in which the question whether a direction
under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. could be issued without prior sanction had been
referred to a larger Bench.
Crucially, the High Court clarified that while
making the reference to a larger Bench, the Supreme Court had not declared the
ratio in Anil Kumar vs M.K. Aiyappa to be per incuriam or bad law.
Accordingly, the High Court applied the ratio in Anil
Kumar.
7.
Investigation Under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Could Not Be Directed Without Valid
Sanction
The High Court held that, in light of the ratio in Anil
Kumar, an order directing investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. could
not be passed in the absence of valid sanction under Section 19 of the
Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
8.
Mechanical Exercise of Power Under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. Is Impermissible
The High Court further held that even at the stage
of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., there must be application of mind by the Magistrate
while directing investigation.
The concerned Court could not act mechanically or
mindlessly.
The application of mind must be reflected in the
judicial order itself.
9. Mere
Formal Statement Is Not Sufficient
The High Court found that the impugned order had
been passed without due application of mind and in a mechanical manner.
The Court specifically clarified that a mere
statement by the Presiding Officer that he had gone through the complaint and
documents and heard the complainant was not sufficient to demonstrate the
legally required application of mind.
On this ground alone, the impugned order was held
to be vitiated and liable to be set aside.
10.
Sanction/Approval Required Before Proceeding Further
Considering the subject matter through which the
complainant attempted to invoke Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. against the petitioners,
who were public servants, the High Court held that valid sanction/approval as
required by law was necessary before proceeding further.
Admittedly, no such previous sanction/approval had
been sought by the complainant to prosecute the petitioners.
Final Order
The High Court concluded that the impugned order
dated 3 July 2020 was illegal and set it aside qua the petitioners.
The connected petitions were allowed.
Important
Clarification
The judgment contains several legally significant
clarifications:
1. Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. Power Is Judicial, Not Mechanical
A Court dealing with an application under Section
156(3) Cr.P.C. cannot merely forward a complaint to the police for FIR
registration and investigation as a routine exercise. The order must demonstrate
meaningful judicial application of mind.
2. Mere
Reference to Complaint and Documents Is Insufficient
A statement that the Presiding Officer has gone
through the complaint, considered the documents and heard the complainant does
not, by itself, establish sufficient application of mind.
3. Public
Servants and Prior Sanction
Where allegations against public servants invoke
offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act and other statutes carrying
specific sanction or approval requirements, those statutory safeguards cannot
be bypassed through a mechanically passed Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. order.
4. Larger
Bench Reference Did Not Automatically Overrule Existing Precedent
Although Manju Surana vs Sunil Arora, (2018) 5
SCC 557 referred the question concerning prior sanction and Section 156(3)
Cr.P.C. to a larger Bench, the High Court expressly noted that Anil Kumar vs
M.K. Aiyappa had not been declared per incuriam or bad law.
Therefore, the High Court followed the existing
ratio in Anil Kumar.
5. Special
Statutes Retain Their Procedural Safeguards
Where special legislation prescribes:
- previous sanction,
- prior approval,
- specific authorisation,
- complaint by a designated authority, or
- mandatory prior notice,
such statutory conditions must be considered before
criminal proceedings are directed.
Sections and
Statutory Provisions Involved
Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973
- Section 156(3) – Magistrate’s power to order investigation
- Section 197 – Prosecution of Judges and public servants
- Sections 133, 143 and 461 – Also referred to in the complaint
Prevention
of Corruption Act, 1988
- Sections 7, 8, 11 and 12
- Section 13(1)(d)
- Section 13(2)
- Section 15
- Section 19 – Previous sanction for prosecution
- Section 5(4) – Status/powers of Special Judge in the context discussed
by the Court
Prevention
of Money Laundering Act
- Section 3 – Offence of money laundering
- Section 4 – Punishment for money laundering
Indian Penal
Code, 1860
The complaint invoked numerous provisions,
including:
- Sections 109, 120-B, 166, 188, 212, 268, 269, 278, 283, 285, 286,
287, 290, 291, 336, 337, 338, 339, 403, 406, 420, 463, 465, 467, 468 and
471
The petitioners also addressed the alleged
non-applicability of various IPC provisions referred to during arguments.
Punjab
Scheduled Roads and Controlled Areas (Restriction of Unregulated Development)
Act, 1963
- Sections 3, 6 and 12
Haryana
Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975
- Sections 3, 10, 11 and 12
Haryana
Municipal Corporation Act, 1994
Relevant provisions invoked in the complaint
included:
- Sections 250, 251, 260, 265, 309/related provision as recorded in
the proceedings, 310, 380, 382 and 384
Air
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981
- Sections 21, 22, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 43
Environment
(Protection) Act, 1986
- Sections 11, 15, 16, 17, 19 and 25
Water
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974
- Sections 20, 32, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 45A, 46, 47, 48 and 49
Forest
Conservation Legislation
Relevant provisions were also invoked in the
underlying complaint as recorded in the judgment.
Other
Laws/Regulatory Frameworks Referred To
- Municipal Solid Waste (Management and Handling) Rules, 2000
- Benami transaction/property legislation
Link to Download the Order-https://mytaxexpert.co.in/uploads/1783415337_1416compressed.pdf
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